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Our age is unique in that we currently possess the technological
ability to alter drastically the lives of succeeding generations to an extent
never before possible. Within minutes we could effectively destroy allUfe
on our planet. While our actions, hopefully, will not be so drastic, there is
precious little life on earth not being affected, for better or for worse, by the
environmental and social practices of our time. Yet to bemoan this state of
affairs is pointless; all history is an account of actions, changes, and effects,
and if this be the path to humanity's destruction, it must also be the path to
humanity's survival. What we can rightfully deplore, however, is the lack
of anticipation and forethought in our conceptions ofproper action. I am not
speaking of the all too common blatant disregard for future conditions in
favor of immediate self-interests, but of the lack of a consistent philosophi
cal articulation of any moral obligation we have to humanity as a whole:
past, present, and future, even among those highly concerned with social
improvement, environmental protection, and the like. To be sure, all
conscientious moral theories implicitly provide for a "better" future through
theirprescriptions, but ifwe expect our collective actions, cultural practices,
and philosophical thought to be moral, in the sense that they serve, in
Washington's words, as "a meliorating influence on all mankind," not just
for a few days, a few years, or even a few centuries, but absolutely, we must
have a clear understanding of the rights and duties concerning the future
inhabitants of our planet (qtd. in Tuchman 299).
Philosophically speaking, the issue of rights is extremely complex
and controversial. In light of the plethora of uses and misuses of the word
"right," both past and present, we must first establish a clear, basic definition
of the concepts involved. Basically, a right is most easily understood as a
claim. However, as Joel Feinberg points out, this definition is somewhat
circular, since a claim is usually defined as something like a right (qtd. in
Beauchamp 197). But the idea of a claim is somewhat more useful in that
it implies both an activity and a recipient. In other words, a claim is
necessarily an action performed by an individual, or group of individuals,
with respect to another individual, or group of individuals. Even claims
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upon material objects entail certain relationships with others by restricting
or mandating the actions of others with regard to the objects. This act of
claiming is essentially a pronouncement of what is "correct" in the relation
ship between the maker(s) and receiver(s) of the claim. Now, there are, of
course, many senses ofthe word "correct," and this is one way to distinguish
among certain types of rights. For instance, the possessor of a legal right
may properly claim to judge (or have judged for him) a certain action as
legal; the possessor of a moral right has the ability to pronounce (or to have
pronounced for him) the morality ofthe relevant activity or state of affairs.
In short, a right is a statement of what is. right, or correct, or proper with
regard to relationships and associations within a given community: legal,
moral, etc. 1
Under our current defInition of a right, the source for authority for
any such claim, or right, is necessarily found within the elements of the
relationship involved in the activity of claiming. What this means is that the
authority for a right originates in the individual or group upon which the
claim is made. And, as before, rights may be further defined and classifIed
according to the association which makes them possible. For example, a
legal right of a citizen of the United States is based upon the internal rules

I believe that this definition offers a good clue to the philosophical
distrust and/or distaste for the concept of rights. A right is often seen as some
sort of semi-mystical possession which governs human interaction, and failing
to find a proper basis for such governance, philosophers reject the notion of
rights, or at least claim that rights are secondary to some other necessary basis
for decisions, such as a theory of ethics or justice in general (see Margaret
Macdonald, qtd. in Beauchamp 208-210; and Ruth Macklin, qtd. in Beauchamp
214-215). And it is the case that a strong argument can be made that in our
present definition of a right assessments of their ultimate value cannot be made
any more than "good" or "right" can be defined anywhere without the help of a
more fundamental outlook. However, to realize these limitations is not to render
the concept or consideration of rights pointless. What an analysis of rights doos
allow is a more practical and immediate judgment of the consequences of more
general ethical theories. An articulation of rights, within any conLcxt, forces
consistent interpretation and formalizes conclusions, which arc two areas of
concern which general theory all too often leaves open to dispute. Particularly
for our purposes, an articulation of the nature of the rights of future individuals
will not so much proscribe specific action as force consideration of future beings
regardless of the ultimate standard of "good" employed in any given ethical
analysis.
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of political association present, and the assertion of such a right takes the
fonn of a claim upon the United States government for the protection,
rectification, or retribution made necessary by a confirmation ofthe right of
the claimant. (Similarly. the government may make a claim upon the
individual, a right to tax, for instance, to the extent which the formal
associ ation between the individual and the government allows.) Other legal
rights, likewise, fmd their origin and authority in the applicable political
association. Rights involving any sort ofcontract necessarily arise from the
association defined by the contract, and those parties involved are hence the
makers and receivers of claims regarding that contract. Certain rights may
be conferred, even without the consent ofthe recipient, if a given association
provides for such actions (e.g., children, citizens in a totalitarian state, etc.),
and again claims are made upon the issuing authority. Equal rights would
be those conferred or agreed to on the basis of some type of equality: as
humans, as citizens, as adults, etc. Thus far we have a fairly consistent
notion that a right is the statement of a valid claim, in relation to a given
association, and that it is from this association that the right derives its
existence and meaning. This may not be as lofty and noble conception of
rights as some people are used to, in that it portrays all rights as contingent
and mutable, but it does not necessarily degrade the rights we possess as
individuals who have entered into, or at least accepted, different associa
tions. On the contmry, it makes the rights we do possess, as citizens of the
United States, for example. all the more valuable in that they represent a
highly evolved and civilized form of association, not merely the long
awaited articulation ofsome supposed standard which humans have always
been endowed with. 2
Here the important question arises: do humans possess any natural
rights which exist prior to any social or political associations? If this were
the case, a claim concurrent with such a right would have to be made in
relation to nature in general. 3 Considering the precariousness which
dominates the association between m ankind and nature, the only valid claim
Many will no doubt see a danger in defining rights as so contingent
and mutable. I admit to this danger, but maintain that it is inescapable, and that
only by acceptance of it may we fully guard against it (see Richard Rorty's
essay «The Contingency of a Liberal Community" in Contingency, Irony, and
Sglidarity).
3 By "nature" I mean that physical set of conditions which exists for
all humans, regardless of social or cultural associations.
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which one could make, or right which one could possess, would be the right
to survive to the best of one's abilities; nature guarantees nothing but a
chance, and in some cases a slim chance at that. Yet this simple right to a
chance for survival may be more significant than it seems at first glance. For
if a human, through his or her action, deprives another human ofthat chance
for survival which that individual would have had if notfor his or her actions,
has not that which all humans-as creatures of nature-possess been
altered, has not a right possibly been violated? If a human perishes through
the actions of a hungry tiger, the violence of a lightening bolt, or the force
ofan earthquake, nothing unnatural has occurred, and hence no natural right
could have been violated or moral rule transgressed (assuming, of course,
that no other human was responsible for the victim's presence in such
dangerous circumstances). But in as much as human action changes the
conditions ofan individual's relation to his or hernatural circumstances and
lessens the chance for survival which would have otherwise been present,
a right may be said to have been violated. Iffhis analysis is correct, it would
mean that there is one right which may be regarded as absolute, which
applies to all humans by virtue of their being creatures of nature (or, if you
prefer, by necessarily existing within a certain range of physical conditions
and conforming to certain physical restrictions and standards): each human
has a right to survive to the best of his orher abilities. Of course, under the
det1nition and theory that the maintenance of a right, yours or another's, is
what is. right, if every human possesses this right absolutely, it is restrictive
in the sense that no person may rightfully deprive another ofthis right, even
in the assertion of his or her own right.
How, then, does this view of rights concern future individuals?
Clearly, in as much as most rights are contingent upon associations and/or
agreements made, individuals who do not yet exist cannot be said to possess
any such rights. True, some current political associations, for instancc, will
grant certain rights concurrcnt with the existence of a new individual life,
and it certainly seems proper and moral for us to guarantee that those rights
which we currently value should be available to new individuals, but they
certainly cannot possess them prior to existence.4 However, in as much as
any absolute right exists rorall humans regardless of any associations, a case
4 This is true not so much because claims could not be made, although
that would be somewhat problematic, but because no association has been fanned.
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can be made that the right of survival to the best ofone's abilities exists ~
forallindividuals who will come into being,5 In other words, the individuals
ofthe future may be said to atemporallypossess arightofsurvival to the best
their abilities, free from any hindrance by other individuals, prior to the fact
of their existence,6 Hence. the right to survival to the best of one's abilities
is not merely absolute in the sense that every human has, does, and will
automatically possess it, but that all humans who do and will exist possess
that right at any given time,'
!fthe rightto survival to the best ofone 's abilities exists, what duties
or obligations does it entail, if any? First, we should consider the notion of
correlative rights and duties in general. Tom Beauchamp summarizes this
thesis as follows, "One person's right entails someone else's obligation to
refrain from interfering or to provide some benefit, and all obligations
similarly entail rights" (202). The standard criticism of this view is that not
all rights entail duties and/or that not all duties entail rights. Beauchamp
asks, "Such goods as adequate housing, clothing, food, health care, educa
tion, and a clean environment populate the United Nations list of 'human
rights,' yet does anyone have a corresponding duty" (205)? I would assert
that under a definition of rights as valid claims upon associations that an
individual deprived of onc or more of these goods could make a valid claim
Of course, when we enter the world our right 10 survival to the best
of our abilities on our own is not much of a right, but we shall discuss the extent
to which other humans are obligated to help us assert our right when we exam
ine correlative duties to this right.
6 As to the metaphysics of possession without being, I would offer that
perhaps as an absolute right applies to all humans, it also applies 10 humanity as
a whole. And if humanity has a right to survive to the best of its abilities, this
right is effectively represented by a conception of the rights of not yet existent
humans.
, As to the possession of this universal right by individuals who have
died, they have presumably exercised their right to survive to the best of their
abilities and failed at some point, thus sacrificing any possible future assertion
of that right. This is not to say that their rights may not have been violated
during their lives to such an extent that they did die, or that some sort of
compensation to humanity should not be extracted fTOm the violators of their
rights, but it is to say that any further protection of their right is futile. As Ernest
Partridge points out, "The distinction [of rights between the unborn and the
dead] follows from the fact that we (or perhaps others) can affect the conditions
of life of the unborn, but we cannot alter the completed lives of the dead" (249).
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upon the United Nations and rightfully demand that the situation be rectified
to the extent which the association makes such rectification possible. The
organizations and agencies of the United Nations no doubt think that they
are, to the best of their ability given the limited authority vested in their
association with citizens of member nations, working to establish and
protect these rights as is their duty. Certainly in a situation where the
maintenance of these rights is rendered impossible, members ofthe United
Nations consistently appeal to the association as a whole to fulfill a duty to
come to their aid. The problem here is that some rights can only be stated
as futile claims owing to the lack of authority present in the association
responsible for the creation of these rights. This does not mean no duty
exists, but that the right itself is insubstantial since a right, as a claim,
divorced from effective duty, is essentially empty rhetoric. g Likewise, Joel
Feinberg argues that there exist duties which do not correlate with rights. He
says, "Duties of charity, for example. require us to contribute to one or
another of a large group ofeligible recipients, no one of whom can claim our
contribution from us as his due" (qtd. in Beauchamp 204). But what is the
origin of these "duties of charity?" Under Feinberg's analysis a "charity
judge" could presumably be appointed to go to individuals, in the name of
all in need of charity, and reprimand them for not giving to someQne. This
idea is absurd: for there simply exists no such duty beyond promises made
by individuals explicitly orirnplicitly, by membership in an association. For
example, as a Catholic a given person, in the affirmation of his or her
religious beliefs, may have acquired a duty to be charitable, and the Catholic
Church would then certainly have a right to demand that person fulfill his or
her duty and be charitable toward someone in need. In essence, the
confusion here is caused by the broad sense ofthe word "duty." Duties exist,
as rights do, as the result ofassociations and the ensuing repayment of debts
or fulfillment of promises, but we often inappropriately (at least from a
strictly philosophical perspective) see the duty as toward the object of the
promise, for instance, as opposed to the individual or group to which the
promise was made.9

I would, however, agree that these rights are "claimable" only in so
far as individuals are involved, through the aegis of their own government, with
the U.N., not as humans in general.
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How does the correlativity thesis then apply to the aforementioned
absolute right of survival to the best of one's abilities? An absolute right
would have to be correlated to an absolute duty, or a duty which is binding
universally, upon all aspects of the association between humanity and
nature. In a sense, nature fulfills its duty by being consistent, in that certain
actions will, according to the so-called Laws of Nature, always produce
certain results. But humans also JX)ssess a duty to 1) survive to the best of
their abilities and 2) ensure that others are able to survive to the best oftheir
abilities. In other words. human beings have an absolute obligation to adopt
practices (environmental, cultural, social, philosophical, etc.) which allow
all existing, and future existent. human beings to survive to the greatest
extent which they are capable ofsurviving. This would necessarily entail the
creation and maintenance of the most effective institutions, mechanisms,
and associations JX)ssible to maximize the survival possibilities of all
humanity. This rather encompassing duty goes beyond a simple principle
of non-interference in an individual's "natural" ability to survive because
the abilities of the individual in question are, under humanity's absolute
duty, to be given every JX)ssib1e chance of manifestation in so far as another
individual's possibilities are not mitigated. And to the extenl which
nature-as it exists within each human-can act to fulfill this obligation, it
is morally bound to do so. Summarily, human beings are absolutely
obligated La maximize the survival possibilities contained within other
humans, and all future humans, to the extent which the knowledge and
ability of those thus obligated permits. Thus a human being, as an absolute
possessor of the right to survive to the best of his or her abilities, is also, by
the nature ofhis or her humanity and material existence, the embodiment of
the absolute duty to protect and promote this same right in the rest of nature
as it exists in other present and future human beings.
9 A further distincLion is oftcn made in this regard, as Mill and Kant
have done, in discussions of perfect and imperfect duties. In Mill's case this
seems to be just a distinction between what is basically an articulated, legal right
(a perfeet duty) and more implicit types of rights resulting from some sort of
moral association (imperfeet duties) (see Utilitarianism 48-49). In Kant's case,
this distinction secms to reflect a difference between absolute and contingent
standards which could be translated as absolute and contingent rights (see
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Moral~ 5,39-42). In both cases, the argument
for strict correlativity can still be made.
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This admittedly somewhat polemical conclusion may be valid ifwe
accept the given definition of a right, a claim, and a duty. But what are the
consequences of such a view from an ethical perspective? In order to best
answer this question, I shall attempt an analysis ofsome other philosophical
positions and evaluate their stance on the problem of rights and obligations
concerning the future, and thus demonstrate the implications and meanings
of the view set forth above.
Many philosophers have recently maintained that the idea of rights
being possessed by the future is not a sound basis for ethical decisions.
Richard T. DeGeorge offers three compelling reasons against the idea of
"future rights." First, he states, "Future generations by definition do not
exist now. They cannot now, therefore, be the present bearer or subject of
anything, including rights" (95). On one level, of course, this makes perfect
sense, in as much as rights are considered a "possession" equivalent to a
material object. But there are numerous cases one can think of that lead to
a different conclusion. If a baby is born, and there is no clean air for that child
to breathe, and he or she dies after a few months, certainly, if there is
anything like a right to a chance for survival free from the debilitating effects
of another human's actions, it has been violated. Now, the violation, or
action which caused an improper situation, could have happened at any time
before the birth of the child, but may not have become physically evident
until the child was born. We may say, then, that DeGeorge's viewpoint
confuses violation of a right with evidence of that violation. Practically,
there is little difference, but without a philosophical position which accepts
violation as possible before it is evidenced, the prevention of violations
would be rendered exceedingly difficult. Under our previous analysis,
humanity, as a species, would also possess the right to survive to the best of
its abilities, and if future children cannot survive that right has certainly been
violated. Whether or not the "possession" ofthe right is actually had by the
child before it exist.;; or by humanity as a whole actually, again, makes little
difference. For the child of the future effectively serves as the instantiation
ofany rights ofhumanity, and thinking in tenns ofthe child possessing rights
is the most practical way to ensure nothing is violated.
Secondly, DeGeorge states that "Such future generations could at
least in theory be prevented from coming into existence. If they were never
produced it would be odd to say that their rights had been violated. For since
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they do not now exist they can have no right to exist or be produced. Now,
they have no present rights at all" (96). Again, if we consider a right of
humanity to survive-and thus also a duty to allow, even promote its
survival, in the sense of making such survival more likely-we see that
preventing future generations from coming into existence m.&l violates this
right of humanity as a whole, and thus the right of every individual which
would have existed. Now, ofcourse the objection and/or concern here is the
question of possible humans verses actual future humans. BryonG. Norton
recognizes this problem when he states, "There is a distinction between
possible or potential individuals and future individuals .... Future people, ...
are people who will, in fact exist at some subsequenttime. Itmightbe argued
that even possible people have rights, for instance, a right to life... . Hence
every avoidable failure of conception would involve the violation of a right
to exist" (321). The solution to this problem ofdistinction between possible
and actual future individuals may be clarified by a restatement ofmy original
position. All human beings who will come into existence possess an
absolute right to survive to the best oftheir abilities. Likewise, humans have
an absolute duty to maximize survival possibilities of every human who
comes into existence. Ofcourse, we seemingly have no way ofdistinguish
ing between possible individuals and actual individuals until they are, in
fact, actualized. But, let us consider how they are actualized. For it is
through the actions of existing humans that a possible being is made an
actual being. Thus, while we do not know ~ will exist 100 years from
now, we do have control over, and a duty toward, those beings. And, if we
are to maximize the survival potentials of those beings, as well as humanity
as a whole, a large measure of this may be accomplished simply by
manipulation oftheirnumber. Basically, what I am arguing here is that our
correlative duty to the absolute right of all individuals to survive to the best
of their abilities entails responsible procreation, simply because this is an
extremely important way in which we presently affect, through our actions,
the lives of those future individuals who will exist. This is not the "easy way
out" in that, as James L. Hudson says, " ... we can always avoid violating the
rights of future people by preventing their coming into existence" (101).
Nor does it represent, as Hudson later states. " ... a sort of !!!Q!1ll coereion
which is equally illegitimate" since it violates a right to "blameless procre
ation" (102). Rather, it represents a proper acknowledgment of the right of
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all future humans and our duty towards them. To be sure, there was a time
when it was a duty to procreate as much as possible in order to ensure the
sUIvival of the race and maximize survival possibilities for the future, but,
at present, achieving this same goal defmitely requires different actions.
Derek Parfit raises a similar sort ofobjection in his construction of
what has come to be known as "Parfit' s Paradox." Essentially, he claims that
a policy of high consumption of environmental resources, which is clearly
not acceptable to us, will produce different future individuals than a more
restrained policy would, for a variety of reasons. But those individuals
produced under a period of high consumption would not exist but for the
depletion of resources, and it would be more against their interests not to
exist than to be deprived ofany given resource (qtd. in Norton 322-3). What
Parfit's supposed paradox actually does is provide us with a good reason not
to blame the past for our difficulties, but this does not abrogate any
responsibility we have to the future. Again, it is up to presently existing
individuals to maximize the survival possibilities of future humans, whom
ever they may actually be. It is also up to present individuals to create future
humans in a way which does not undermine, in fact which enhances, Lhose
same survival possibilities. Thus, high consumption would entail a respon
sibility to low procreation, which may be necessary owing to already
committed acts of high consumption. But, such a continued policy obvi
ously jeopardizes Lhe survival of humanity as a whole thus violating
everyone's rights.
Another aspect of Parfit's argument will be dealt with in consider
ing the final point of DeGeorge. His third objection is that "Speaking of the
rights of future generations as if Lheir rights were present rights ... leads to
impossible demands on us" (97). Essentially, he states that iffuture person..<;
possess rights, and there are an infinite number of future persons, anything
which alters our environment (the use of a non-renewable resource, [or
example) is a violation of some future individual's right. As Norton also
points out, "All Lhis is somewhat bewildering and has, not surprisingly, the
effect of paralyzing rather than guiding decision making" (333). While at
first glance this paradox may also seem true, it actually confuses the
essential factor of human survival with the non-essential aspects of our
culture and society. For instance, humans lived for thousands of years
without using uranium as a power source. We know Lhat it would be
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perfectly possible for the full exercise ofhuman potential wi thout its use. If
we, therefore, deplete the supply of uranium, we are not necessarily
violating any right held by future individuals, cxCcpt in so far as we bring
them into a world which. Wcause of over,population. destruction of other
environmental resources. Of just plain stUpidity. we make the usc of such a
non-renewable resource nec~ssaty for their survival. In other words, if we
construct a society which depends on crude oil for its functioning, and make
no provisions for the inevitable depletion of that resource, and thus leave
individuals 200 years from now faced with the well-nigh impossible task of
a total, sudden restructuring ofsociety once the oil runs out, we have violated
their rights by failing to maximize their survival potential to the extent which
we could have done so without adversely affecting our own survival.
Certainly, this is an awesome duty to live up to, made no less difficult by the
actions ofour predecessors, but it certainly does not paralyze us to the point
of inaction.
There are, however, some philosophers who have suggested ways
in which "rights of the future" may be made more plausible. Bryon Norton
suggests that it is the individualistic nature of basic rights theory which
causes most of the problems which arise in any discussion of rights of future
beings. He says, for instance, "Indeed Rousseau's ethical categories. where
the General Will (the interests of an organic community not reducible to
individual interests) is sharply distinguished from the will-of-all (the aggre
gated interests ofindividuals), may be revived as an important possibility in
modem ethics" (337). This approach, also, would have some problematic
aspects. Namely, that the classical liberal tradition responsible for so much
of basic concept of rights in general lacks a vocabulary of discussion
removed from the cases of individual interactions and individualistic
assertions of rights. But Norton definitely has a point. For instance, in my
arguments above, I often mentioned a right of humanity to survive as a
species to the best of its abilities that somehow went along with an
individual's right to survive to the bcstofhis or her abilities-in as much as
the species and the individual are both objects of the ubiquitous set of
conditions and circumstances we call nature. Perhaps what is needed is an
articulation ofa "species right" somewhat along the lines ofMarx's "species
being." But I believe my position stands well enough without such an
articulation in as much as my considerations of future rights are based only
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upon what I have taken to be an absolute right-<>ne which categorically
applies to all instances ofhumanity, and which thus may be said to apply to
humanity as a whole.
Rolf Satorius also maintains the existence of the rights of future
individuals. He states quite simply that"~ generations ofcourse do not
existllQ.S£,; they have no interests now, vital or otherwise, and they can make
no claims upon us. But the nature of the vital interests they will have is a
valid basis for claims upon us as to how we oUght to behave" (197). And he
even goes so far as to say, " If ~ have a right that government protect Ql!!
right through an effective exercise of the guardianship with which it is
entrusted, ~ have a similar right. My suggestion is that judicial recogni
tion of that right may be required to full secure it" (201). I believe his
statements to be plausible in that he implies that a denial of future rights
would probably entail a denial of rights absolutely, since there would be no
denying the fact that it makes no sense to claim for ourselves what we will
not grant to others who will be in the same situation. His suggestion oflega!
representation does, however, bring up an interesting problem. Any
consideration of rights of the future entails some sort of knowledge about
future conditions and the future consequences of present actions. Our
knowledge in this area is obviously limited and conditional, so how can we
insure an effective basis lor decisions? Just as our duty to the future entails
responsible procreation, I maintain that it also entails responsible investiga
tion. By that I mean we must, to the full extent ofour abilities, seek to know
the possible and probable consequences of our actions. Ignorance of the
scope to which a right is being infringed upon does not mean it has not been
violated. Although responsibility may certainly be mitigated in this way. it
may only be lessened to the point to which possible investigation was done
concerning the effects of present actions. Basically, we have a duty to know
as much as we can so as to maximize both present and future survival
possibilities. But, the ultimate 1ack of certainty in dealing with the future can
not be conscientiously turned into a denial ofcither rights or responsibilities;
it can only be turned into reasonable caution.
Before concluding, I would add a word about the quality of that
survival which results from the exercise of a human's right to survive to the
best of his or her abilities. There are, of course, many forms of "survival"
which no one would wish upon the future. But a guarantee of a chance for
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survival is not enough to fulfill our duty toward the future, for it must be a
survival free from any sort of deprivation (environmentally, culturally,
socially) caused by current action or practice. For to the extent which we
deprive future individuals of choice, possibilities, and freedom of action, we
shall deprive them of that which is the unconditional due to all humans-a
fighting chance. Of course, some impositions are inescapable because ofthe
simple fact that our existence always takes place within a given context, but
contextual restraints are not the same as negligent deprivations. For humans
are also bound to their own struggle for survival, but within our own
struggling, we are not simply struggling for ourselves, but for the future as
well.
We have seen how the adoption of a certain conception of rights as
claims leads to both an accountofthe contingency of most of what we speak
of as "rights," and to the fundamental nature of a right to survive to the best
of our abilities--as individuals and as a species. We have seen how this
absolute right entails an absolute obligation, not only to other recognizable
beings, but to all beings who do or will exist, since they will unconditionally
possess the same right. And we have seen how this position answers some
of the problems inherent in a philosophical clarification in an area of
increasing concern in our lifetimes. Indeed, there are no doubt other
conceptions of responsibility to the future which could serve in this capacity
(theological duties, for instance), but these arguments tend to be weak in the
sense that we have trouble even applying their consequences to the present,
let alone the future. My point is this: in our lives we presently invoke the
notion ofrights a great deal, reflecting the fact that our mind-set is somewhat
comfortable with their use. This is not to say rights theories are free from
problems and contradictions by any means; it is merely to say that a rights
based account ofresponsibility toward the future may be whatis needed to
actualize and vivify our increasingly necessary concern with the ethical
repercussions of our actions, not just within a currently existing moral
community, but within the spectrum of human existence as a whole.
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